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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN LABOR LAW

Antitrust Law-Labor LaW-ILLEGAL "HOT

CARGO"

MAY BE THE BASIS OF ANTITRUST SUIT AGAINST

AGREEMENT

UNION WHICH

COERCES ITS ACCEPTANCE

Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100' the Supreme
Court held that, absent a collective bargaining relationship, a union
loses its antitrust immunity by coercing a general contractor to sign
a "hot cargo" agreement. 2 In reaching its decision, the Court
determined that such an agreement is not protected by the national
labor policy. As the latest effort in the Court's sixty-seven year
consideration of labor's status under the Sherman Act, 3 the Connell
decision follows two of its most recent predecessors, UMW v.
Pennington4 and Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.'
in attempting to define the scope of labor's antitrust immunity. The
vagueness in Connell, like that in Pennington and Jewel Tea,
highlights the Court's inability to resolve the conflicts between labor
and antitrust policy. 6 Connell adds further confusion to this
problem and in so doing serves to illustrate the definite need for
legislative guidance in this area.7
1 421

U.S. 616 (1975).

2 A "hot cargo" agreement in this context refers to a form of secondary boycott activity

whereby a labor union agrees with an employer that the employer will not utilize the goods
or services of another employer with whom the union has a labor dispute.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). The Supreme Court first applied the Sherman Act to a labor
union in 1908. See note 8 and accompanying text infra.
4 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
5 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
6 For a general criticism of the Court's "unprincipled" approach to the labor-antitrust
policy conflict, see Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963). Commentaries after Pennington and
Jewel Tea on this issue include Di Cola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington,Jewel Tea, and Subsequent
Meandering, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 705 (1972); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After
Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 742 (1966); Note, Labor-Antitrust: Collective
Bargaining and the Competitive Economy, 20 STAN. L. REv. 684 (1968).
7 The need for congressional definition of the scope of labor's antitrust immunity has
been recognized by several commentators. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 304-05 (1955); Cox, Labor and the
Antitrust Laws-A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955); Di Cola, supra note 6.
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I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Sherman Act was first held applicable to labor unions in
the Danbury Hatter's Case8 which, like Connell, involved union
secondary activity. 9 Congress legislatively overruled that decision
by passing the Clayton Act,1 0 which attempted to exempt labor
from the antitrust laws and limit the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes. The Court, however, in Duplex PrintingPress Co. v.
Deering" narrowly interpreted the anti-injunction provisions of
section 20 of the Clayton Act' 2 as applying only to workers in a
proximate relation to the dispute, i.e., the employees of the
primary employers. Duplex committed the federal courts to a
decade characterized by the phrase "Government by injunction."' 3
This era of regulation of union activity under the Sherman Act
undermined judicial prestige in the minds of the American public
and labeled the Sherman Act as a weapon of class war that would
be an emotional symbol to future generations. 14 In 1932, Congress
responded to this restrictive decision with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,' 5 which limited injunctive relief in labor disputes to certain
explicitly defined situations. Norris-LaGuardia also broadened the
8 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).

9 At this point it might be best to define certain terms used in this Note.
Most favored nation clause: A clause in a collective bargaining contract by which a
labor union agrees that if it grants a more favorable contract to any employer
it will extend the same terms to all other employers with whom it bargains.
Multiemployer bargaining: Collective bargaining covering more than one company
in a given industry, as when an association of employers organizes as a single
unit for purposes of bargaining with a single union which represents
employees of each individual employer.
Secondary activity: As used here refers to pressure exerted by a union upon an
employer who is not directly involved in a dispute with the union, e.g., a union
causes workers of Company A to refuse to work on or purchase goods of
Company B with whom the union has a labor dispute.
10 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 29

U.S.C.).
1 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters'
Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927). The Duplex decision bears some resemblance to the instant case in
that it not only involved secondary activity by the union, but also construed the labor law
concerned as applying only to employers and employees in a proximate or collective
bargaining relationship. Judge Clark, dissenting below in Connell, recognized this similarity,
although as a matter of statutory interpretation, he saw only a "superficial resemblance"
between his reasoning and that of Duplex. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483
F.2d 1154, 1179 n.1l (5th Cir. 1973).
12 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
14 Winter, supra note 6, at 30.
13

15

29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).

1 (1930).
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definition of a "labor dispute" to include any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment regardless of
whether the disputants stood in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. 1 6 As it forbade court injunctions in cases involving
such "labor disputes," the statute was later held to have closed the
judicially created gaps in the Clayton Act.' 7 Three years later,
Congress enacted a broad statutory framework for the conduct and
management of labor relations in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),' 8 which evidenced a national policy of promoting labor
organization and collective bargaining.
Subsequent decisions of the Court between 1932 and 1945
created a judicial recognition of a nonstatutory exemption from the
Sherman Act for labor organizations. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader'9
the Court held immune from the Sherman Act a union's violent
sit-down strike to obtain a closed shop which prevented the
shipment of the plant's existing inventory in interstate commerce.
Such activity was held exempt from antitrust prosecution because it
was in furtherance of the elimination of nonunion competition, was
privileged by section 6- of the Clayton Act, and had not been
intended to restrain "commercial competition."2 0 Following Apex,
16 Id. § 113(c).
17 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Commentators have
differed as to the Act's intended effect on the antitrust liability of labor unions. Compare
Willis, In Defense of the Court: Accommodation of Conflicting National Policies, Labor and the
Antitrust Laws, 22 MERCER L. REV. 561, 565 (1971) (Congress intended the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to preclude judicial intervention in labor relations through application of the antitrust
laws), with Note, supra note 6, at 701 (Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts protect the
economic weapons that one party to labor dispute can lawfully use to induce agreement, i.e.,
strikes, boycotts, picketing, etc., but do not protect union-employer agreements promoting
anticompetitive schemes).
The Court in Connell did not decide whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded
injunctive relief where, as in this case, a union seeks to coerce an illegal "hot cargo"
agreement. The Court merely conjectured that if, on remand, the subject agreement were
held to be violative of the antitrust laws, it could not assume that Local 100 would resume
picketing to obtain or enforce an illegal agreement. 421 U.S. at 637-38 n.19.
18 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1970). The NLRA established the system of mandatory collective bargaining used
in labor relations today, and created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), vesting it
with powers to supervise the established system of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-60 (1970).
19 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
20 Id. at 495. The Court declared that the Sherman Act would continue to apply to
union activities that affected or restrained "commercial competition." The opinion distinguished restraints on the product market from restraints on the labor market, a distinction
which some commentators believe the courts are unable to make given the inherently
ambiguous effects of labor activity on prices and levels of production. See Winter, supra note
6, at 42 (distinction between product market and labor market restraints cannot be soundly
made in the context of a system of collective bargaining based on employer organization
along product market lines); Di Cola, supra note 6, at 708. In Apex the Court determined that

1976]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

the Court in United States v. Hutcheson 21 apparently departed from
the "commercial competition" test of antitrust immunity. The
Court held that union conduct during a labor dispute was immune
from the operation of the antitrust laws. The rule of the case was
formulated in the following statement:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit [union conduct]
under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by
any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness
or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of2 2the end of which
the particular union activities are the means.
However, it remained for the Court to treat a problem raised by
Justice Frankfurter in Hutcheson-union-employer combinations
that effected price restraints, production allocation, or other
market control schemes proscribed for employers acting without
labor union involvement.
The Court condemned such a conspiracy four years after the
Hutcheson case. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in Allen
Bradley v. IBEW Local 3,23 found an antitrust violation by the local
the union's purpose in imposing the sit-down strike was dispositive, and thus followed
previous decisions which had employed a purpose-motive analysis to resolve suits against
labor unions under the Sherman Act. In these cases, liability resulted if the Court conceived
of the union's purpose as an attempt to impose restraints on competition in prices or
production-the product market-rather than on wages, hours, .or extension of union
organization. Representative of this approach are UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344
(1922), and Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
21 312 U.S. 219 (1941). The Hutcheson Court, by weaving together § 20 of the Clayton
Act and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ruled that these two statutes made the Sherman
Act inapplicable to the practices specifically enumerated in § 20, at least if they occurred in
the course of a labor dispute.
22 Id. at 232 (footnotes omitted).
23 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The case arose out of a situation in which Local 3 had organized
both the manufacturers of electrical equipment and electrical contractors in its New York
City jurisdiction. The union, manufacturers, and contractors agreed that the contractors
would purchase only equipment made by the manufacturers, who in turn agreed that they
would restrict their sales in New York to those same contractors. The union policed the
entire scheme and augmented the restrictive agreements by assisting in bid-rigging among
the contractors. The union also prevented nonunion operations through picketing and
boycotts. The end result was higher wages and shorter hours for Local 3's members, greater
profits for the manufacturers and contractors, and monopolistic prices for the public. See
Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 41 F. Supp. 727, 728-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (Master's
Report); Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 51 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). The conspiracy
in Allen Bradley mutually benefitted the union, the manufacturers, and the contractors and
was willingly entered into by the employers. Furthermore, the conspiracy was challenged on
antitrust grounds by an electrical contractor who had been excluded from the market. The
conspiracy alleged by Connell in the instant case, however, appears to be of a materially
different character. See note 86 infra. For a detailed and perceptive analysis of-Allen Bradley,
see Winter supra note 6, at 45-59.
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union for two interdependent reasons. First, it had not been acting
alone but "in combination with business groups," and second, the
industry-wide understandings had intended and had achieved
price and market controls.2 4 Thus, the policies of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the NLRA Were to be subordinated to the
competition ethic of the Sherman Act when a union participated in
a business monopoly. The Court, however, noted that its
conclusion meant that "the same labor union activities may or may
not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether
the union acts alone or in combination with business groups. 2 5 In
1945, then, the Supreme Court established that absent a business
conspiracy to which a union was a part, judges would not impose
antitrust liability for activity undertaken by a union in its
26
self-interest.
Congress amended the NLRA in 194727 and 195928 to regulate
labor's use of secondary activity as an economic weapon in the
industrial struggle. This legislation made the NLRA applicable to
many anticompetitive problems. It did not, however, specifically
preclude the application of the antitrust laws to all union activity.
Consequently, the scope of labor's antitrust immunity before
Pennington and Jewel Tea remained uncertain. 29 Various proposals
for legislation during the period from 1945 to 1965 sought to
provide antitrust sanctions for union activity based on the Apex
30
distinction between labor market and product market restraints.
Other proposals imposed antitrust liability upon specific union
activities which produced anticompetitive market effects. 3 1 In
24

325 U.S. at 799, 800.

25 Id. at 810.
26

Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1943), exemplifies the extent of a labor union's

exemption at this time. In this case, a Teamsters' local imposed a secondary boycott on an
employer's principal customers out of spite against the employer. The employer lost the
customers' business as a result of the boycott. The Court held, however, that the union's
activity was beyond the reach of the federal antitrust laws: "That which Congress has
recognized as lawful, this Court has no constitutional power to declare unlawful, by arguing
that Congress has accorded too much power to labor organizations." Id. at 825 n.1.
27 In 1947 the NLRA was amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947
(Taft-Hartley), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 29 U.S.C.).
28 Congress amended the NLRA again by enacting the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
29 Winter, supra note 6, at 58.
30 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-

304-05 (1955).
31 Cox, supra note 7, at 284. Professor Cox proposed a statute which set forth the
national antitrust and labor policies and proscribed specific labor union conduct as violative
of the antitrust laws. He saw fit to exclude from antitrust liability secondary boycotts in aid of
TRUST LAWS
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addition, suggestions for further amendment of the NLRA were
made with the objective of outlawing specific union economic
weapons other than those proscribed by the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin amendments, such as the elimination of "most
favored nation" clauses and modification of multiemployer
bargaining. 32 In sum, the scope of labor's antitrust exemption
during this period was undefined. In large measure, this
uncertainty resulted from the conflict between a national policy
favoring freely competitive business markets on the one hand, and
the national labor policy promoting the combined action of
workers, organized along product market lines, on the other
hand.3 3 The Court, in UMW v. Pennington3 4 and Amalgamated Meat
organizing campaigns and strikes for higher labor standards because he believed that these
activities should be regulated in the context of the labor laws. In the opinion of Professor
Cox such boycotts "do not significantly hamper our efforts to maintain a competitive
economy." Id. at 282.
32 Winter, supra note 6, at 70-73. But see Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,
and
the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659, 701 (1965). It is significant that Professors Winter
and Meltzer disagreed as to the intent of the Taft-Hartley Congress in abandoning proposals
to eliminate the Clayton Act's labor exemption with regard to union engagement in direct
market restraints. This disagreement foreshadows that between the majority and dissent in
Connell. Professor Winter is apparently in accord with Justice Stewart's belief that Congress,
in making secondary activity violative of the labor laws, intended the labor law remedies for
such conduct to be exclusive. Winter, supra note 6, at 66. Professor Meltzer, on the other
hand, agrees with Justice Powell's opinion that the enactment of labor law remedies does not
preclude the application of the antitrust laws. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 65 (1947).
33 Attempts at judicial resolution of the conflict between the two policies have been seen
as unavailing due to the inherent limitations of the judicial process and its dependence upon
principled analysis. Under the Sherman Act, for example, a union, to the extent that it
restrains competition in any market, succumbs to the doctrine of per se illegality which was
developed in business conspiracy cases under the Act to overcome the evidentiary burden of
proving a conspiracy in restraint of trade. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 210-18 (1940). Another doctrine developed under the Sherman Act would infer a
conspiracy from "things actually done" in order to overcome the evidentiary obstacle of
proving a conspiracy. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600, 612 (1914). Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), by announcing
the doctrine of "conscious parallelism," represents the furthest reach of the inference of a
conspiracy from acts otherwise innocent: "Acceptance by competitors, without previous
agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if
carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful
conspiracy under the Sherman Act." Id. at 227.
The implications of such a rule of law for the multiemployer bargaining system
described at note 9 supra are readily apparent. Agreements between labor and management
on subjects such as wages, hours, and conditions of employment will necessarily tend to
lessen competition in both the labor and product markets. But an attempt to eliminate such
anticompetitive effects by application of the Sherman Act subverts the national policy of
promoting industrial peace through negotiation. On the one hand, the application of an
Apex Hosiery "market effects" test in the labor-antitrust field to judge the legality of union
activity ignores the possibility of various motives on the part of the union. On the other
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Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co. 35 attempted once again to address

36
this labor-antitrust policy conflict.
Pennington involved allegations of a Sherman Act conspiracy
between large coal mine operators and the United Mine Workers
Union to force smaller mine operators out of business by establishing a minimum wage scale which the smaller operators could
not afford to pay. 37 It was alleged that a multiemployer bargaining
agreement had been negotiated in the industry to effect the
conspiracy's illegal purpose.
With regard to the alleged conspiracy, Justice White determined that even though the subject of the agreementwages-was a mandatory bargaining subject under the NLRA, such
an agreement, when entered into for the purpose of running the
employers' competitors out of the market, would result in the loss
of the union's antitrust immunity.3 8 However, he also
acknowledged that it was "beyond question that a union may
conclude a wage agreement with the multi-employer bargaining
unit without violating the antitrust laws," 39 and that the union
could, as a matter of its own policy, seek the same wages from
hand, confining "legitimate" union practices to activity in the labor market (wages, hours,
and working conditions, for example) disregards an equally difficult problem: intended
restraints on the product market may often be as easily achieved through conventional labor
market techniques as by direct product market restraints. See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 691,
696. This inherent ambiguity has led one commentator to the conclusion that unions should
be exempt from Sherman Act liability for any conduct undertaken in pursuit of economic
self-interest. Winter, supra note 6, at 65-70. Compare Willis, supra note 17, at 578-79 (it is the
duty of the judiciary to attempt resolution of the conflict in the absence of congressional
guidance for the conciliation of labor-antitrust conflicts).
34 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
3 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
36 The Court divided into three groups of three justices in both Pennington and Jewel
Tea. As a result, there were five separate opinions for the two cases. Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, delivered the opinion of the Court in Pennington,
and announced the judgment of the Court inJewel Tea. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Black and Clark, concurred in Pennington and dissented in Jewel Tea. In a single opinion,
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented from the opinion but
concurred in the reversal of Pennington, and concurred in the judgment in Jewel Tea.
37 The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial because of an erroneous charge
to the jury in which the district judge failed to give proper scope to the doctrine of Eastern
R.R. Presidents' Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 356 U.S. 127 (1961) (competitor's attempts to
influence public officials exempt from the Sherman Act). The Court, however, considered
the labor-antitrust issue in rejecting the union's contention that the trial court had erred in
denying its motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See 381
U.S. at 669-72.
38 The Court states its position as follows: "But we think a union forfeits its exemption
from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to
impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units." Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 664.
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other employers. Justice White, in addition, said that a union, in
unilaterally adopting a uniform wage policy and seeking to
implement it, did not have to align its wage demands with those
that the industry's weakest employers could afford to pay, even
though it might suspect that some employers could not effectively
40
compete if they were required to pay the wage scale demanded.
But the "more basic defect" in the agreement was that the union, in
agreeing to impose the wage scale upon other employers, had
surrendered its freedom of action with respect to future
bargaining. 4 1 Justice White's opinion has been criticized for failing
to state what evidence, apart from the multiemployer agreement,
would be necessary to establish an illegal conspiracy. 42 He did
allude to "other evidence" in the case, but declined to comment on
its sufficiency other than to say that there must be "additional
43
direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy."
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, felt no such
reservation as to the evidence necessary to establish an antitrust
violation. Justice Douglas stated that an industry-wide collective
bargaining agreement which imposed a wage scale beyond the
financial ability of some employers to pay, and which was entered
into for the purpose of driving those employers from the market,
45
was "prima facie evidence" 44 of an Allen Bradley conspiracy.
Justice Goldberg concurred in the reversal but dissented from the
46
opinion of the Court.
40 Id. at 665 n.2.
41 Id. at 668.

Di Cola, supra note 6, at 718. Failure to set an evidentiary standard leaves certain
practical matters in question. For example, whether the parties to a multiemployer
agreement might discuss the effect of a wage increase upon their competitive positions in the
market, the future plans of the union, or the effect of a proposed wage increase upon
marginal employers are matters left unresolved by the Pennington opinion. See Cox, Labor
and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317, 323 (1966).
Furthermore, unions and employers might be forced into clandestine bargaining or needless
refusals to agree on bargaining subjects in order to avoid the possibility of antitrust liability.
In a later case alleging a Pennington-type conspiracy to impose a wage rate outside the
bargaining unit, the Court held that the preponderance of the evidence is needed to sustain
Sherman Act conspiracy charges against labor unions. Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302
(1971).
43 381 U.S. at 665 n.2.
44 Id. at 673.
45 Justice Douglas, by invoking the "conscious parallelism" doctrine of Interstate Circuit
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), would apparently infer an antitrust conspiracy from
evidence of a multiemployer collective bargaining agreement and injury to an employer
group. See note 33 supra.
46 381 U.S. at 697. Justice Goldberg's position was that agreements reached on
mandatory subjects of bargaining-wages, hours, and working conditions-should be
exempt from the antitrust laws. Id. at 710.
42
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In Jewel Tea 47 an association of food retailers had agreed with
the union not to sell prepackaged meat before 9 a.m. or after 6
p.m. Jewel Tea signed the agreement under protest after being
threatened with a strike, and thereupon brought suit under the
Sherman Act alleging that the marketing hours restriction imposed
by the agreement was a direct restraint of trade. In approaching
the question whether the marketing hours clause was within the
nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust law, Justice White
observed that the facts did not present a Pennington union-service
market employer conspiracy against self-service market employers
like Jewel Tea. 48 Relying upon a district court finding of fact that
had not been reversed on appeal,4 9 the Court held that the
marketing hours restriction was so "intimately related" to wages,
hours, and working conditions that the union's imposition of the
restriction, unilaterally and in its own self-interest, fell "within the
protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt
from the Sherman Act." 50 In a footnote, however, Justice White
stated that the "crucial determinant" was not the agreement's form
but its relative impact on the product market as balanced against
the interest of union members in obtaining it.5' This "balancing
47 Unlike Pennington, the majority in Jewel Tea was composed of the White and
Goldberg groups, although these Justices divided three-to-three as to the rationale for the
decision. See note 36 supra.
48 381 U.S. at 688-89. A service market is one in which a butcher is present behind a
meat counter to cut, weigh, and package meat for customers. A self-service market is one
where meat is set out, weighed, priced, and prepackaged for customer selection. Jewel Tea
argued that because it was a self-service operation, it could sell prepackaged meat at night
without requiring butchers to do night work. In a critical finding of fact, however, the
district court found that night sales would adversely affect the butchers. See note 49 infra.
49 The district court had found that self-service store night operations would require
butchers to do night work, work longer hours, or face the prospect of nonbutcher
encroachment upon the union's work jurisdiction. Jewel Tea Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 189,
215 F. Supp. 839, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
50 381 U.S. at 689-90.
51 Id. at 690 n.5. The "legitimate union interest" test has been deemed "inherently
ambiguous." Di Cola, supra note 6, at 721. Commentators other than Mr. Di Cola have also
seen the test as susceptible to various constructions. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at
757-59. Justice White's opinion apparently separates the question of the union's immunity
from that of substantive violation of the antitrust laws. The question of violation arises only
when the union's claim of immunity is found wanting. The "balancing test" then requires the
Court to determine whether the benefit of an agreement to a union outweighs the injury to
consumers produced by its direct restraint on the product market. The decisive factor in
such a balance will ultimately be the economic prejudices of the judiciary with courts
weighing the social desirability or undesirability of the union's objectives. Congress, however,
prohibited the courts from this practice by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Cox, supra note 42,
at 326. Finally, in terms of antitrust policy, the "balancing test" makes less sense than did the
Apex Hosiery product market-labor market distinction. In Apex Hosiery, antitrust liability, at
least in theory, turned on the existence of anticompetitive strictures in the product market.
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test," then, was to determine whether or not the union interest is
"legitimate," that is, whether union effort to obtain the agreement
is exempt from the antitrust laws. If the restraint on the product
market is direct and immediate and if the subject matter of the
agreement is not so "intimately related" to wages, hours, and
working conditions that it falls within the exemption, then there
should be no antitrust immunity.
Justice Douglas dissented, maintaining that the multiemployer
agreement between the union and the retailers association was
evidence of an antitrust violation. 52 Justice Goldberg, on the other
hand, believed that the marketing hours was a mandatory subject
of bargaining and reiterated his position in Pennington that
agreement on such subjects should be exempt from the antitrust
laws.
The Court next considered the legitimate union interest test in
American Federationof Musiciansv. Carroll.5 3 This decision illustrated
that the balancing test could be applied to achieve any result
compatible with the economic predelictions of the courts.5 4 In so
doing, the Court's opinion illustrates that the test lacks a general
Justice White's "intimate relation" test, on the other hand, allows such restraints if they are
outweighed by the court-determined union interest in imposing them.
52 381 U.S. at 735. Justice Douglas, disagreeing with Justice White, believed that "in the
circumstances of this case the collective bargaining agreement itself ... was evidence of a
conspiracy among the employers with the unions to impose the marketing-hours restriction
on Jewel ....
" Id. at 736. Justice Douglas argued that the multiemployer bargaining
agreement alone was prima facie evidence of a Sherman Act conspiracy because it restrained
competition on night meat sales. No other evidence of a union-employer conspiracy to
impose the restraint was necessary.
53 391 U.S. 99 (1968). In Carroll a musician union's bylaws prescribed price lists for
"club-date" (single night) engagements and imposed restrictions on band leaders preventing
them from accepting bookings from agents unlicensed by the union.
54 The majority in Carroll held that the direct market restraints were "necessary to
assure that scale wages will be paid to the sidemen [union musicians) and the leader" and
were therefore exempt from the antitrust laws. 391 U.S. at 112. Even though the union
imposed direct market restraints by setting prices, it was established that in the "club date"
field, the price was substantially equivalent to the wages paid when the band leader actually
performed as a musician. However, the legitimate union interest test is distorted when the
leader does not perform but only acts as an agent. Requiring minimum prices in such a
situation leaves the leader unable to compete with other agents in the field by lowering his
fee for entrepreneurial effort. Justice White, in dissent, pointed to this difference. Id. at 117.
Carroll indicated a willingness on the part of the Court to extend the labor exemption to
cover unilateral union restraints on product market competition that have a substantial
effect on wages, hours, and working conditions. Justice White's dissent indicates that it went
beyond his formulation of the legitimate union interest test and that the balance in Carroll
was struck differently than it had been in Jewel Tea. The Court was not without some
support, however, in upholding the restraints. A lower federal court had allowed a similar
pricing device in Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1960).
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principle which can be applied, notwithstanding the judiciary's
subjective economic preferences, to reach similar results in similar
cases. The failure of the Court to agree on a consistent approach to
the question of labor's antitrust immunity in Pennington and Jewel
Tea gave lower courts a choice of theories in labor-antitrust cases,
thus maintaining the confusion in this area of the law.5 5 The scope
of labor's antitrust immunity and the conflict between the national
antitrust and labor policies, therefore, remained unresolved issues
when the Connell case arose.
II
CONFLICT WITHIN THE COURT IN

Connell

In aid of its attempt to organize plumbing subcontractors in
its geographical jurisdiction, Plumbers Local 100 requested that
Connell Construction Company, a general contractor employing no
plumbers, sign an agreement providing that it would subcontract
its plumbing work only to firms with which the union had a current
collective bargaining agreement. 56 Connell refused and the union
picketed one of its construction projects causing a total work
stoppage. Connell thereupon filed an antitrust action in a Texas
state court, obtaining a temporary restraining order against the
picketing. When Local 100 successfully removed the case to federal
court, Connell signed the subject agreement under protest and
amended its complaint to allege a Sherman Act violation. The
district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal
antitrust law because it was permitted by the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA 58 and because federal labor
legislation preempted state antitrust laws.5 9 On appeal, 60 the Fifth
5 Courts have confused the legitimate union interest test with the conspiracy theory of
antitrust liability or have ignored the former where it would be relevant in determining
immunity. See, e.g., Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1973); Cedar Crest Hats, Inc. v.
United Hatters I.U., 362 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1966).
56 Local 100 had negotiated a Master Area-Wide Collective Bargaining Agreement with
a multiemployer association of about 75 mechanical (plumbing) contractors in 1968 and
1971. The multiemployer agreement contained a "most favored nation" clause by which the
union agreed that if it granted a more favorable contract to any other employer, it would
extend the same terms to all members of the association. Brief for Petitioner at 4, 13-14,
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for Petitioner].
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975).
58 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
'9 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
60 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973). This case
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Circuit affirmed with one judge dissenting. The Supreme Court,
voting five to four, reversed on the question of antitrust immunity
and unanimously affirmed the ruling that the national labor policy
preempted state antitrust law in regulating labor union activities in
aid of organization.
A.

Analysis of Potential Antitrust Liabilities

Speaking for a divided court, Justice Powell 6 ' addressed
himself first to the union's claimed antitrust immunity. After briefly
discussing the statutory and nonstatutory basis of the labor
exemption, Justice Powell stated that labor policy does not require
that a union have the freedom to impose direct restraints on
competition among those who employ its members, even though
that policy requires tolerance for the reduction of business
competition based on wages and working conditions. 6 2 Here,
according to the majority, the agreement went beyond that
"tolerance": it not only restrained subcontractor competition based
on wages and working conditions, but also "indiscriminately
excluded" from competition those subcontractors who derived a
competitive advantage by more efficient operating methods rather
than by paying lower salaries or providing substandard working
conditions. This agreement, the Court continued, would have the
is noted at 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 595 (1974); 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 416 (1974); 52 TEXAS
L. REv. 170 (1973). The opinions below in Connell reflect the confusion of lower federal
courts in the labor-antitrust area. The district court reached the labor law question and held
that the agreement was exempt from the antitrust laws because it fell within the construction
industry proviso to § 8(e) of the NLRA. It therefore held that the union's picketing to coerce
Connell's acceptance was not an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(b)(4). The Fifth
Circuit, however, without deciding whether the "hot cargo" agreement or the coercive
picketing was illegal under the NLRA, held that the union retained its antitrust immunity
for two reasons. First, the union was acting unilaterally and not in conspiracy with a
nonlabor group, and second, the agreement furthered a legitimate union interest because it
was directed at the elimination of competition among plumbing firms on the basis of wages
and working conditions. Connell argued that the agreement fell outside the § 8(e) proviso
for want of a collective bargaining relationship between it and Local 100. Therefore, it
maintained that the union's picketing to coerce the agreement was an illegal secondary
boycott under § 8(b)(4). The court refused to decide this labor law question, deferring to the
jurisdiction of the NRLB. The court, however, did hold that the labor law status of the
agreement and the coercive picketing to obtain it were irrelevant to the question of the
union's antitrust immunity. The agreement furthered the legitimate union interest of
extending subcontractor organization; its anticompetitive effects (which the court held were
outweighed by the union's interest) would not change depending on whether or not Connell
employed union members. See 483 F.2d at 1168-69. Therefore, in the court's opinion, a
union could pursue a legitimate union interest by means of an unfair labor practice without
losing its antitrust immunity.
61 Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist.
62 421 U.S. at 622.
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actual and potential anticompetitive effect of allowing Local 100 to
control access to the mechanical subcontracting market, which in
turn would have adverse effects on consumers. Furthermore, it
would ultimately allow Local 100 to create a geographical enclave
for local contractors by refusing to bargain with "travelling"
subcontractors. 63 The union's goal of organizing as many
subcontractors as possible was legitimate; the Court, however, held
that this fact would not make the union's methods of reaching that
goal exempt from the antitrust laws. Subcontractors organized by
another union or nonunion subcontractors paying union scale
wages and providing comparable working conditions were also
excluded from the market by the agreement. Consequently, a
"restraint of this magnitude" would not be entitled to an antitrust
exemption even if included in a lawful collective bargaining
agreement. 64 Therefore, whether or not Connell employed Local
100 members was irrelevant to the question of antitrust
immunity. 65 The agreement in question would apparently have
resulted in a loss of that immunity in either case.
The Court then turned to the union's contention that the
agreement was protected by the construction industry proviso to
section 8(e) of the NLRA. 6 6 Connell argued that the proviso was
6' Connell did not allege a conspiracy between Local 100 and the unionized
subcontractors bargaining association. The Court found no evidence of agreement between
the two groups to coerce the "hot cargo" agreement in question other than the
multiemployer contract's "most favored nation" clause. Id. at 625 n.2. Ironically, the
anticompetitive effects listed by the Court in Connell are the same as those that were actually
accomplished in Allen Bradley and potentially accomplished in Pennington. Both of those
cases, however, were argued on the "conspiracy with a nonlabor group" theory and had
considerably more evidence from which to infer such a conspiracy than the present case. See
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 656, 659-61 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325
U.S. 797, 800 (1945). Connell did allege that it was an "unwilling" conspirator in the union's
attempt to impose restraints on mechanical subcontractor competition. Brief for Petitioner at
10-11.
64 421 U.S. at 625-26.
65 Id.

Section 8(e) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or
to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement
entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void: Provided, that nothing in this subsection shall apply
to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other
work . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
66
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"hot cargo"

agreements

between

employers

and

employees in a collective bargaining relationship. The Court
agreed with Connell despite the unqualified language of the
statute. 67 Connell was held not to be an employer within the

meaning of section 8(e). In so deciding the Court relied on National
Woodwork ManufacturersAssociation v. NLRB6 8 which had held that a

section 8(e) agreement was valid where it was entered into by
parties in a primary relationship to protect the employees' work
opportunities. Connell had argued that it was a neutral party as
between Local 100 and the mechanical subcontractors it sought to
67 Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the NLRA in an effort to
plug "technical loopholes" in § 8(b)(4)'s general prohibition of secondary activities. The
Supreme Court in Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door), held
that § 8(b)(4)'s general prohibition of secondary boycotts did not prevent an employer from
voluntarily agreeing to boycott another's products or services. The legislative history of
§ 8(e), the section of the Landrum-Griffin amendments designed to cure the loophole
exposed in Sand Door, contains statements to the effect that the construction industry
proviso's purpose was to maintain the "status quo" of collective bargaining in the
construction industry. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 8(e), see National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). The issue was of great importance in
Connell as both Connell and Local 100 admitted that the antitrust case turned on the
meaning of the § 8(e) proviso. The NLRB and the courts of appeals which had considered
the issue held that picketing to obtain an agreement valid under the proviso was legal. See
District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Painters Local 48 v.
NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir.
1963); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (B. & J. Investment Co.), 214 N.R.L.B.
No. 86, 87 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1974); Northeastern Ind. Bldg. & Trades Council (Centilivre
Village Apts.), 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
68 386 U.S. 612 (1967). In determining whether the agreement was authorized by the
§ 8(e) proviso, the Court stated that "the touchstone is whether the agreement or its
maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contractor vis-h-vis his own
employees." Id. at 645. In National Woodworkers a contractor agreed with his own employees
that he would not use prefabricated doors in construction jobs. The agreement amounted to
a union boycott of work done off the jobsite-prefabrication-but was upheld because of the
primary relationship between the agreeing parties.
The NLRB had taken the position that a union did not violate §§ 8(b)(4)(A) or 8(e)
when it obtained an otherwise valid subcontracting clause under the § 8(e) proviso from a
contractor who did not employ employees of the craft represented by that union. See, e.g.,
Northeastern Ind. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Centilivre Village Apts.), 148 N.L.R.B.
854, enforcement denied on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Furthermore, the
General Counsel of the NLRB had refused to issue complaints in cases similar to Connell,
because he was of the opinion that the § 8(e) construction industry proviso permitted "hot
cargo" agreements between parties not in a bargaining relationship. See QUARTERLY REPORT
OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Jan. I Mar. 31,
1974), 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 9045 (1974). A detailed analysis of the purpose and scope of the
§ 8(e) proviso as construed by the NLRB and the courts is beyond the purpose of this Note.
The Connell court, however, has established a new component of a valid subcontracting
clause. See note 71 infra. The General Counsel's QuarterlyReport, supra, contains a history of the
§ 8(e) construction industry proviso litigation.
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organize.6 9 In addition, the Court held that the agreement was
outside the proviso because it "was not limited to jobsites on which
[Local 100's members] were working. 7 0° Later in his opinion,
Justice Powell stated that the agreement could be the basis for an
antitrust suit because it was "outside the context of a collectivebargaining relationship and not restricted to a particularjobsite."'
Since the union's purpose was not to protect Connell's employees
or its own members from working alongside nonunion men and
since it was not trying to organize the plumbing subcontractor on
the job site it picketed, the union activity fell outside the section
8(e) proviso.7 2 To agree that the proviso authorized such an
agreement with a stranger (i.e., neutral) general contractor "would
give the construction unions an almost unlimited organizational
weapon. ' 3 The Court thought it "highly improbable" that
Congress intended such a result given the NLRA's restrictions on
primary organizational campaigns.7 4 Consequently, absent a "clear
69 Brief for Petitioner 10-11. In NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1951), the Court held that a general contractor and his subcontractors on the
samejobsite were separate legal entities. Therefore, picketing at the site to force a general to
compel his subs to sign union contracts was secondary boycott activity in violation of
§ 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA. Since the Court in Connell presumed that the construction
industry proviso to § 8(e) was intended to maintain the "status quo" of collective bargaining
in that industry (see note 67 supra) the Court apparently saw Sand Door as representative of
that "status quo" in the absence of legislative action to overrule the Denver Building Trades
holding that general contractors and their subs on a common jobsite are separate legal
entities for picketing purposes. The Court also found support for its interpretation of the
§ 8(e) construction industry proviso by comparing it to the garment industry proviso to
§ 8(e). 421 U.S. 628-30 & 633 n.13 (1975). See Danielson v. ILGWU Joint Board, 494 F.2d
1320 (2d Cir. 1974).
70 421 U.S. at 631.
71 Id. at 635 (emphasis added). This second requirement-restriction of the agreement
to a particular jobsite-is new to § 8(e) litigation and appears to have originated with the
opinion of Justice Powell. Whether nonrestriction to a particular jobsite would, in itself,
remove a "hot cargo" agreement from the § 8(e) proviso is unclear, but Justice Powelrs use
of the conjunctive "and" in holding that the agreement may be the basis of an antitrust suit
seems to indicate that this component must exist along with the lack of a collective
bargaining relationship.
72 Justice Powell, citing Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
agreed with dictum in that case that the purpose of the construction industry proviso to
§ 8(e) was to prevent situations in which union men had to work alongside nonunion men on
the same construction site. As a result, he determined that the agreement was outside the
proviso because it would prevent neither Connell's employees nor Local 100's members from
having to work alongside nonunion men.
73 421 U.S. at 631.
74 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (1970). See Dallas Bldg. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d
677 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In that case, the court opined that coercive picketing would be
permissible if the coverage of the proposed agreement were limited to the type of work
never performed by the general contractor's own employees. The agreement in this case,
however, unlike that in Connell, covered work done by the general's own employees. The
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indication" that Congress intended the section 8(e) construction
industry proviso to apply to secondary relationships, the Court
refused to so read the proviso.
Finally, Local 100 argued that the agreement, even if outside
the section 8(e) proviso, could not be the basis for antitrust liability
because the NLRA remedies for such a violation were exclusive.
Rejecting this contention, the Court noted that in the Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA, Congress had chosen to regulate
secondary activities by creating special remedies under the NLRA,
and in so doing had rejected attempts to regulate those activities
by repealing the antitrust exemptions in the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 75 The Court, however, found this
legislative choice irrelevant because it dealt only with secondary
activities prohibited by section 8(b)(4). This case, on the other
hand, involved a "hot cargo" agreement which Congress outlawed
in 1959. Because the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the NLRA
did not amend section 303 expressly to provide a remedy for
violations of section 8(e) alone, the Court maintained that
[t]here is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress suggesting
that labor-law remedies for § 8(e) violations were intended to be
exclusive, or that Congress thought allowing antitrust remedies
in cases like the present one would
be inconsistent with the
76
remedial scheme of the NLRA.

Finally, the Court held that federal labor policy preempts state
antitrust law in the regulation of union organizational activities.
court, therefore, held that picketing to coerce acceptance of the agreement had a recognitional objective and consequently violated the general prohibition of recognitional picketing
found in § 8(b)(7). Local 100 relied on this distinction in contending that picketing to coerce
acceptance of its "hot cargo" agreement was legal because Connell did not employ any
plumbers.
15 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 29 U.S.C.). By adding NLRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970), Congress
provided an action for actual damages sustained as a result of union secondary activity. In
addition, the Taft-Hartley amendments added NLRA § 10(1), 20 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970),
which authorized the NLRB, but not private parties, to sue in the federal courts for
injunctive relief against union secondary activity.
7c 421 U.S. at 634. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, found "considerable evidence in
the legislative materials" for the contention that Congress intended § 303 to provide the
exclusive private remedy for violations of § 8(e). Id. at 650. His argument was solidly based
on.the legislative history of both the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments to the
NLRA. See notes 84, 89 infra. The Connell majority, however, referred to this argument in a
footnote, and then only to state its disagreement. Since the relevant legislative history is
unclear on the subject, congressional intent is highly debatable. Four members of the Court,
however, interpreted it to mean that Connell should not have an antitrust action against
Local 100. Given that a contrary interpretation was critical to the Court's decision, perhaps a
more detailed rebuttal to Justice Stewart's argument was required.
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The Texas antitrust laws created too great a risk of conflict with the
NLRA to be allowed to operate in the area of union organizational
activity. However, the Court left open the possibility that "other
agreements between unions and nonlabor parties may yet be
subject to state antitrust laws."17 7 The Court did not elaborate on
this point.
B.

The Position For Antitrust Immunity

Speaking for four members of the Court, 78 Justice Stewart
maintained that Congress had intended the additions and
amendments to the NLRA in 194779 and 195980 to provide the
exclusive remedy for illegal union secondary boycott activity.
Unlike the majority, Justice Stewart believed that the legislation
clearly warranted this conclusion:
The relevant legislative history unmistakably demonstrates that
in regulating secondary activity and "hot cargo" agreements in
1947 and 1959, Congress selected with great care the sanctions to
be imposed if proscribed union activity should occur. In so
doing, Congress rejected efforts to give private parties injured by
union activity such as that engaged in by8 Local 100 the right to
seek relief under federal antitrust laws. 1
Discussing the legislative history leading to the enactment of
section 303 of the NLRA, 82 Justice Stewart argued that the
7
78
79

Id. at 637.
Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered

sections of 18, 29 U.S.C.).
80 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
81 421 U.S. at 639.
82 In the form in which it passed the House, § 12(c) of the Hartley Bill, H.R. 3020, 80th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 1 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT
OF 1947, at 205 [hereinafter cited as 1947 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY], provided that the Norrisshould not apply in private suits for relief from "unlawful concerted
were defined as "illegal boycotts . . . designed to compel people against
engaged in to place their business with some other than those they are
the time." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 44, 1 1947
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 315, 335. However, the Senate refused to adopt the House's removal
of antitrust immunity for prohibited secondary activity, accepting instead Senator Taft's
compromise proposal for a private damage remedy. 93 CONG. REc. 4874-85 (1947), 2 1947
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1399-1400. In conference, § 12(c) of the Hartley Bill was eliminated.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 58-59 (1947), 1 1947 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 562-63. Senator Taft's compromise proposal became § 303 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187, when Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments.
The Supreme Court in Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), held that
the § 303 compensatory damage remedy preempted state law that provided punitive
damages for injury sustained by a secondary boycott. In discussing the nature of the § 303
remedy, the Court said:
LaGuardia Act
activities" which
whom they are
dealing with at
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majority had misinterpreted congressional intent by holding that
Congress had not meant section 303 to be the exclusive private
remedy for violations of the section 8(e) prohibition of "hot cargo"
agreements. Thus, in outlawing those agreements in 1959,
Congress had also amended section 8(b)(4) to make it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to threaten or coerce a
neutral employer, either directly or indirectly through his
employees, where an object of the secondary pressure is to force an
83
employer to enter into an agreement prohibited by section 8(e).
Concurrent with the amendment of section 8(b)(4), Congress
expanded section 303 to allow recovery of actual damages
sustained as a result of "any activity or conduct defined as an'unfair
labor practice in section 8(b)(4). ''8 4 Therefore, since the Court held
the agreement outside the construction industry proviso to section
8(e), Local 100's coercive picketing was a section 8(b)(4) unfair
labor practice against which Congress had already provided
Connell with a fully effective damage remedy. 8 5 In concluding that
Connell did not have an antitrust case against Local 100, Justice
Stewart opined that a nonunion mechanical contractor who had
been excluded from the market as a result of a voluntary "hot
The type of conduct to be made the subject of a private damage action was
considered by Congress, and § 303(a) comprehensively and with great particularity
"describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objectives."
Carpenters Local 1976 v. Labor Board, 357 U.S. 93, 98. In selecting which forms
of economic pressure should be prohibited by § 303, Congress struck the "balance
• . .between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their
respective interests," id., at 100, by "preserving the right of labor organizations to
bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and [by]
shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not
their own." Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
692.
Id. at 258-59 (footnote omitted).
s' 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970) now provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents:
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(A) forcing or requiring any employer ... to enter into any agreement which is
prohibited by subsection (e) ....
84 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1970).
85 Justice Stewart did not decide whether the agreement was within the § 8(e) proviso
and, if so, whether Local 100 could picket to obtain it, because in his view Connell could not
maintain an antitrust suit in either case. 421 U.S. at 648 n.8.
It is questionable whether Connell would be able to prove any monetary damage as a
result of being forced to use only union mechanical subcontractors. It was established below
that Connell used both union and nonunion subcontractors through the competitive bidding
process. Indeed, Connell had not sought treble damages in the action, but only injunctive
and declaratory relief. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012
(N.D. Tex. 1971). It is at least a plausible inference that the union subcontractors were
competitive with their nonunion counterparts.
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cargo" agreement between Connell and Local 100 might well have
86
a valid antitrust claim.
Justice Stewart found further support in the legislative history
of the Landrum-Griffin Act for his contention that Congress intended to make the NLRA remedies for proscribed union secondary activity exclusive. He noted that Congress, in 1959 as in 1947,
rejected amendments to the NLRA which would have imposed
antitrust liability on unions for engaging in illegal secondary activ87
ity.
Finally, in agreeing with the majority that the NLRA and
federal labor policy preempts state antitrust law from regulating
union organizational activity, Justice Stewart cautioned that
[t]he judicial imposition of "independent federal remedies" not
intended by Congress, no less than the application of state law to
union conduct that is either protected or prohibited by federal
labor law, threatens "to upset the balance of power between labor
88
and management expressed in our national labor policy."

Although joining in Justice Stewart's dissent, Justice Douglas
filed a separate opinion to point out what he considered to be the
8' 421 U.S. at 649 n.9. Such a claim would present an Allen Bradley fact situation. There,
antitrust charges were brought by an electrical contractor who had been excluded from the
electrical contracting market by the union-manufacturer-contractor combination. See note 23
supra. A similar situation would have presented itself in Connell had a plumbing contractor
alleged that Local 100 and Connell had voluntarily agreed to exclude nonunion plumbing
contractors from the market in plumbing subcontracts. The facts in Connell, however, show
that Connell, unlike the willing employers in Allen Bradley, steadfastly opposed the
agreement with Local 100. Indeed, Connell itself brought antitrust charges against the union
for attempting to coerce the "hot cargo" agreement.
Although he would deny Connell an antitrust action, Justice Stewart stated that the
general contractor would nevertheless have a damage remedy under § 303 if the union
attempted to enforce a proscribed "hot cargo" agreement by picketing. On this point, Justice
Stewart was in agreement with the majority opinion below. See 483 F.2d at 1174.
87 Representative Hiestad of California introduced H.R. 8003, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), which was "in the nature of antitrust legislation, applied to labor unions." 105 CONG.
REC. 12,135 (1959), 2 LEGISLATivE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1507 [hereinafter cited as 1959 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The
Landrum-Griffin Bill, H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958), on the other hand, provided
that the new secondary boycott and "hot cargo" provisions were to be enforced solely
through the NLRB and by use of the § 303 actual damage remedy. See 105 CONG. REC.
14,347-48 (1959), 2 1959 LEGISLATrVE HIsToRY 1522-23. The House rejected an attempt to
amend H.R. 8400 by inserting the antitrust provisions of H.R. 8003. Subsequently, the
House-Senate conferees added the construction and garment industry provisos to § 8(e), and
Congress thereafter enacted the Landrum-Griffin Bill without any provisions exposing
proscribed union secondary activity or "hot cargo" agreements to antitrust liability. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 1 1959 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 934.
88 421 U.S. at 655, quoting Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964)
(footnote omitted).
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"determinative feature of the case":8 9 Connell had failed to allege a
conspiracy between Local 100 and the unionized subcontractor's
bargaining group to eliminate nonunion subcontractors from
the market. Therefore, in Justice Douglas's opinion, Connell's complaint alleged unilateral union activity, the remedy for which was
provided exclusively by the NLRA. 90
III
ANTITRUST IMPACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY UNIONS

As the decision in Connell reversed the opinion of the General
Counsel of the NLRB on the scope of the section 8(e) construction
industry proviso, 9 1 it will have direct and immediate effect upon
labor relations in the construction industry. Beyond that impact,
however, it may open a floodgate of litigation on the scope of
labor's antitrust immunity. Therefore, an understanding of the
Court's analysis of antitrust liability is necessary to guide lower
federal courts in this area. Unfortunately, apart from indicating a
possible judicial trend toward expanding labor's antitrust liability,
the Court provides little guidance for subsequent labor-antitrust
cases.
It is not clear on what theory the Court decided that Local 100,
in coercing the "hot cargo" agreement, forfeited its antitrust immunity. However, several lines of analysis suggest themselves from
the majority opinion. To the extent that ambiguity in the Court's
decision will prevent a clarification of the issue, Connell continues
the trend of those precedents which have unsuccessfully attempted
92
a clear and useful resolution of the labor-antitrust conflict.
Initially, the Court may have looked beyond Connell's pleadings and found that the prima facie evidentiary test propounded by
Justice Douglas in Pennington was met. 93 If this is what happened,
89 421 U.S. at 638.
90 This failure of pleading and proof would appear to have been the only reason for
Justice Douglas's conclusion that the union did not lose its antitrust exemption. The Connell
case involved a multiemployer bargaining agreement with a "most favored nation" clause, a
combination of economic weapons which he considered a prima fade antitrust conspiracy in
Pennington andJewel Tea. Unlike the majority, however, Justice Douglas did not consider the
multiemployer bargaining agreement relevant here because Connell had failed to allege it as
part of a conspiracy. Id.
"' See note 68 supra.
92 See note 33 supra.
93 See text accompanying note 44 supra. Unlike the situation in Pennington, however, the
instant case did not present an antitrust complaint by a party threatened with exclusion from
the product market.
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the multiemployer bargaining agreement, with a "most favored
nation clause," must have been itself, regardless of motive, an
antitrust conspiracy violation. Connell, it should be noted, alleged a
conspiracy insofar as it claimed that it was coerced into "conspiring" with Local 100 to exclude unorganized -mechanical subcontractors from the market; it did not allege a conspiracy between the
union and the plumbing subcontractors. 94 Although not relied on
by Connell as a conspiracy in itself, the multiemployer bargaining
contract with the "most favored nation clause" was nevertheless
seen by the Court as "relevant in determining the effect that the
agreement between Local 100 and Connell would have on the
business market. ' 95 Such an agreement existed in Pennington but
was challenged there by a party allegedly excluded from competition with the multiemployer bargaining unit. The plaintiff in Allen
Bradley was similarly situated. 9 6 Connell, on the other hand, did not
compete with the plumbing contractors in Local 100's Master
Area-Wide Bargaining Agreement, 97 and therefore could not have
been excluded from competing with them by the multiemployer
contract. In this respect, Connell's complaint was materially different from those filed in Allen Bradley and Pennington.Justices Douglas 98 and Stewart9 9 pointed to this difference in their respective
opinions. This factual distinction would appear to render inapposite the conspiracy analysis apparently applied by the Connell majority.
A further indication that the Court applied this "combination
with a nonlabor group" theory in Connell is Justice Powell's consideration of the actual and potential anticompetitive effects of the
"hot cargo" agreement-effects which bear striking resemblance to
those that had been actually imposed in Allen Bradley, 10 0 the archetypal "combination with a nonlabor group" case. The Court
may have found any one of three possible liability-producing
conspiracies on the facts: the Connell-Local 100 agreement alone;
94 421 U.S. at 625 n.2.
95Id. at 623.
96 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
97 See note 56 supra.
98 See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
11 See note 86 supra.

100 The anticompetitive effects projected by the Court are only speculative. There was
no indication in the record or briefs that Local 100 had refused to bargain with any
mechanical subcontractors, or that there was any evidence of conspiracy between Local 100
and the multiemployer bargaining group other than the existence of the multiemployer
contract including the "most favored nation" clause. Cf UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965).
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the Local 100-multiemployer bargaining group contract; or the
Connell-Local 100 agreement as augmented by the Local's multiemployer contract. It is conceivable that the Court viewed the
third situation as a per se unlawful combination in restraint of
trade. If so, the Court went beyond Pennington. A per se view
would explain the Court's ambivalence toward Local 100's otherwise legal objective of organizing as many subcontractors as possible because such analysis would render motive irrelevant. An
underlying theory of labor-nonlabor conspiracy would also explain
the majority's projection of the agreement's potential anticompetitive effects.
Another possibility is that the Court applied Justice White's
Jewel Tea legitimate union interest test to Local 100's activity. 10 1
Apparently the Court struck the balance in the following fashion:
Local 100 has a direct interest in eliminating nonunion competition
based on wages and working conditions. However, its agreement
goes beyond eliminating that type of competition and excludes
from the business market both subcontractors organized by other
unions and nonunion subcontractors, even though those excluded
may pay union scale wages and provide comparable working conditions. Because the product market effect is much broader than the
interest of the union members in obtaining the agreement (as the
Court weighs that interest) the balance falls in favor of encouraging
product market competition: "Curtailment of competition based on
efficiency is neither a goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary
effect of the elimination of competition among workers. Moreover,
competition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust
10 2
laws strive to protect.'
The balancing test appearing in Connell, however, bears little
resemblance, if any, to that purportedly applied in United Federation
101See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
102 421 U.S. at 623. The Court, however, may be taking an unduly narrow view of the
union interest in extending its organization to all subcontractors in its geographical
jurisdiction. The extension of collective bargaining is a recognized means whereby union
members also derive nonwage, nonworking condition benefits to the extent that it provides
the union members with a larger share of the "social sovereignty." See generally, Perlman, The
Principleof Collective Bargaining,in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND THE PUBLIC 45 (Bakke, Kerr &
Anrod ed. 1960).
On the other hand, the Court may be intimating that organizing as many subcontractors
as possible is not a legitimate union interest where unilaterally-pursued objectives transcend
the elimination of wage and working condition differentials. Thus, if the union is also
seekingjob security, work preservation, and work opportunities for its members, the Court
may find these interests illegitimate. This finding, however, exhibits nothing other than the
economic predelictions of the Connell majority. It also presumes that the Court is in a
position to know better than the union what is in the latter's best interests.
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of Musicians v. Carroll.10 3 These cases, in reaching such divergent
results from the legitimate union interest test, suggest that the test
produces an unprincipled approach to the labor-antitrust conflict,
which is incapable of consistent and rational application through
04
the judicial process.
The majority's holding that the section 8(e) construction industry proviso is applicable only in the context of a collective
bargaining relationship is justified on the basis of NLRB v. Denver
Building & Construction Trades Council.'0 5 Nevertheless, this result
seems reminiscent of Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering'0 6 and an
era in which courts determined "what public policy in regard to the
industrial struggle demands."' 0 7 Furthermore, since antitrust liability results from the agreement being outside the proviso (for -want
of a primary relationship), it must be asked how this criterion for
immunity is related to the anticompetitive effects of the agreement
itself. Presumably the construction industry proviso would shield
an agreement to exclude a third party from competition if the
agreement was between a contractor and his own employees. Yet
such an agreement would have the same anticompetitive effects as
did the "hot cargo" agreement in Connell. Basing the union's
liability on the lack of a primary relationship, however, could mean
that a legislative reversal of Denver Building Trades would also
weaken Connell's foundation for imposing antitrust liability.' 0 8
103 391 U.S. 99 (1968); see notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra. The Carroll Court
applied the Jewel Tea balancing test in holding that a union had a legitimate interest in
imposing price lists and other direct restraints upon band leaders. Perhaps the significant
difference between the tests imposed in Carroll and Connell is the composition of the Court.
Cf. Di Cola, supra note 6, at 756 n.237.
104 See note 6 supra.
105 341 U.S. 675 (1951); see notes 69-74 and accompanying text supra. See also National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
106254 U.S. 443 (1921); see notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
107 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting opinion). See Winter, supra note 6.
108 The Duplex decision was in part responsible for the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Congress

attempted to legislatively overrule Denver Building Trades in 1975. See H.R. REP. No. 155,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). H.R. 5900, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), if enacted, would have
authorized "hot cargo" agreements between general contractors and the employees of
subcontractors working on the same construction site, and would also have sanctioned
"common situs" picketing (picketing of the entire job site by one subcontractor's employees).
In effect the proposed bill would have been a recognition of the "dose community of
interest" between all parties on a common construction site. See Comment, The Impact of the
Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 684-89 (1951).
President Ford, although previously indicating his intention to sign the bill into law (see N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6), vetoed it on January 2, 1976, as a result of heavy
pressure from so-called right-to-work factions, contractors, and conservatives. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1976, § 1, at 7, col. 3. As both the House and Senate votes on the picketing measure
of the bill fell far short of a two-thirds majority, it was extremely unlikely that the veto would
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Finally, the majority determined that Congress did not intend
to make the NLRA remedies for section 8(e) violations exclusive.
This conclusion does not comport with the congressional pattern of
dealing with unfair labor practices through amendments to the
NLRA rather than by imposing antitrust sanctions. Justice Stewart
argued quite forcefully that the Court should not impose sanctions
which Congress had previously rejected. 10 9
CONCLUSION

The extent to which labor unions, in their self-interest, should
be allowed to restrict employer competition is an emotional issue.
The very nature of a labor union is anticompetitive insofar as it
restricts employer competition based on wages and working
conditions. Given union organization along product market lines,
such restriction must affect prices and production. Congress,
however, has proscribed certain union activities by amending the
NLRA. In so doing, it has chosen to remedy abuses of labor power
through the imposition of labor law sanctions and not by
application of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, in the past, judicial
imposition of the Sherman Act to regulate union activity has
aroused public ire and resulted in a loss of judicial prestige.
Additionally, the courts have proved incapable of arriving at a
definition of the scope of labor's antitrust immunity. The divergent
opinions of the majority and dissent in Connell, as to whether or not
Congress intended the labor law remedies for unfair labor
practices to be exclusive, highlights the confusion of the judiciary
on the labor-antitrust issue. The need for explicit legislative
guidance in this area is clear. This fundamental question of labor
policy must be left to the political process because it calls for the
drawing of arbitrary lines in effecting compromise between the
national labor and antitrust laws. Only Congress, not the courts,
can resolve this conflict.
F. Kevin Loughran
be overridden. Although this might have overruled the Connel majority's requirement of a
primary relationship, the implications of the Court's second requirement, limitation to a
particular jobsite, would remain unclear. It will be the task of lower federal courts to
construe this second component of a § 8(e) violation.
109 421 U.S. at 646-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting opinion).

